

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
 OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

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Investigation of:

M/V COSCO BUSAN/BRIDGE ALLISION
 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

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 * Docket No.: DCA-08-MM-004
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Interview of: MST2 PETER ANDERSON

Wednesday,
 January 30, 2008

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to
 notice, at 10:50 a.m.

BEFORE: CRYSTAL THOMAS
 National Transportation Safety Board

APPEARANCES:

CRYSTAL THOMAS

National Transportation Safety Board

PAUL STANSEL

Hazardous Materials Accident Investigator

National Transportation Safety Board

LT ROBIN ELLERBE

Coast Guard Legal

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:50 a.m.)

MS. THOMAS: Okay. It's January 30th, 2008, approximately 10:50 a.m. This is Crystal Thomas with the National Transportation Safety Board. Today we're going to be interviewing Peter Anderson. We'll go around the room and say who's here today.

MR. STANSEL: Paul Stansel (ph.) with the NTSB.

MST2 ANDERSON: Petty Officer Peter Anderson.

LT ELLERBE: And I'm Lieutenant Ellerbe with Coast Guard Legal.

MS. THOMAS: Okay.

INTERVIEW OF MST2 PETER ANDERSON

BY MS. THOMAS:

Q. I know we had talked before. Could we just go over again -- could you just give me your role and responsibilities as a Pollution Investigator?

A. As a Pollution Investigator I was dispatched through Incident Response to assess what was spilled on the water. We were also sent to look at bridge structural integrity, and once we assessed what we could assess on the water go aboard and determine what the max capacities of the tanks that were damaged or ruptured and what was missing and in the water.

Q. Okay. What time did you leave Sector San Francisco?

A. I know I received notification around 8:30. We were

1 down at the docks about ten minutes later. Like five to ten
2 minutes after that we were underway, so 8:50.

3 Q. Okay. And your first stop was at the bridge?

4 A. Was at the bridge. We sent a text image of the
5 damage and I think we also did that for the tear in the side of
6 the Cosco Busan. But we were just assessing minor damage,
7 structural damage, that we could view, and then we were
8 standing by for further authorization to move on, if the
9 Command Center had any questions. I think they were
10 coordinating with Army Corps as far as assessing the damage,
11 but as far as we could tell there was no structural damage to
12 the concrete -- so it was just a -- damage.

13 Q. And when you arrived at the Cosco Busan what were
14 your observations?

15 A. Along the way, I mean we saw the 3 x 4 oil slick that
16 was fairly consistent, thick, black crude, and we reported that
17 when we saw it. When we came up to the Cosco Busan you could
18 see the trail kind of just looped out over towards San
19 Francisco and then came back around to the -- towards the Cosco
20 Busan.

21 At the time that we arrived at the Cosco Busan at
22 9:30 there was like a inch bead coming out of the tank, and
23 within five minutes it turned into a seep and then just like
24 flat and stopped altogether. And we saw the damage on the ship
25 was -- I mean it's been described many times, but like a 80 to

1 100 foot gash, 20 feet high, 10 foot off the waterline. And
2 once the oil stopped, you know, it had like a crust on the hull
3 of the ship from the movement, but they were in place in
4 Anchorage Number 7 when we got there.

5 Q. Okay. Could you tell that the damage to the vessel
6 had affected the fuel tanks?

7 A. Fuel tanks? No, I could not. I could not tell that.

8 Q. Could you see the sounding tubes from outside of the
9 vessel?

10 A. Not with the naked eye.

11 Q. Okay. Who did you --

12 A. We saw that -- you know, that they were surveying the
13 damage.

14 Q. Who was surveying the damage?

15 A. The ship's crew. They were trying to get the best
16 look at it as possible. We saw they were along the rail.

17 Q. How were they surveying that?

18 A. It's hard to say. I think I remember someone hanging
19 over the side --

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. -- trying to look at it.

22 Q. Okay. Who did you report your observations to and
23 how did you report them, cell phone or radio?

24 A. Through cell phone. And I can't speak for the boat
25 crew, but I know that they were making reports back to their

1 people, as well. I reported to the Command Center and -- I was
2 making a lot of reports, myself and Petty Officer Eaton, so it
3 was whoever I could get a hold of in our chain of command, so
4 it was usually Chief Mosley or MST2 Munoz that I was talking
5 to. And we just reported what we observed along the way as far
6 as the spill quantification, the 3 x 4 thick black crude,
7 approximately 2 nautical miles or whatever the distance is from
8 the bridge to the Anchorage Number 7, and then the dimensions
9 of it and that it had stopped leaking at 9:35 through our
10 observations.

11 Q. Are you aware of what Mosley or Munoz was doing with
12 the information, who they were passing it to?

13 A. They said they were going into a conference call at
14 the Command Center, and I kind of lost touch with them for a
15 little bit because they were in the Command Center and that's a
16 no cell phone zone. But I've worked in the Command Center
17 before, so I was giving them concurrent briefs to the
18 Situational Controller, whoever else answered the phone,
19 because there was a lot of action going on.

20 Q. Okay. Once you boarded -- who gave you permission to
21 board the vessel?

22 A. That came from the Command Center.

23 Q. Okay. And once you boarded the vessel what was your
24 initial action?

25 A. Signing in and then waiting for the Chief Engineer.

1 Q. How long did it take to meet up with the Chief
2 Engineer?

3 A. It wasn't too long, under five minutes. I went right
4 away to the ship's office.

5 Q. Is that where he met you, the ship's office?

6 A. No. He met us right there. It's -- you know, my
7 experience is it's best not to go wandering around the ship
8 trying to find someone.

9 Q. Okay. And then he took you to the ship's office?

10 A. Then we went to the ship's office.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. He started to explain, like -- he was trying to
13 explain his actions.

14 Q. What did he tell you?

15 A. From what I remember he was saying that he was the
16 first one to notice it, and he was starting to go into what
17 he'd done to mitigate and that he had immediately started to
18 transfer to the other tanks once they knew that they had a
19 rupture.

20 Q. How did he know that there was a rupture?

21 A. I can't specifically remember because his English
22 wasn't the best, but I think he was saying something to the
23 effect that he saw a drop on the gauges or like they were doing
24 transfer and there was a pretty drop or --

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Yeah, that's -- I can't remember for certain, so I'd
2 just be speculating.

3 Q. Okay, but he was the first to notice it. And then
4 what were his actions following that?

5 A. Following that?

6 Q. Did he explain them to you?

7 A. What he did explain was that immediately after he
8 noticed that there was some kind of puncture he started to
9 transfer out of the Number 3 and the Number 4 tanks to the
10 double-bottom -- flow tank.

11 Q. How did he know it was 3 and 4?

12 A. My guess is from looking over the side of the ship.

13 Q. Did you ask him what the quantities were in Tanks 3
14 and 4?

15 A. Yes. I was having a hard time getting -- you know,
16 getting the idea across to him what I needed so, you know, I
17 asked for the Oil Record Book so I could kind of get it in
18 straight numbers of -- and he showed me the max capacities
19 prior to the incident for the Number 3 and the Number 4 tanks,
20 the type of product, and that's when I went to ask how was left
21 in them and he was saying that they were an ongoing transfer,
22 and so he gave me rough numbers as far as the amount that was
23 transferred.

24 That's when I asked him to conduct the sounding of
25 the Number 3 and the Number 4 tanks. I believe myself and

1 Petty Officer Eaton started to go over what he gave us, try and
2 make sense of it looking at ship's diagrams while he was
3 conducting the sounding. That's when we came to the semi-
4 conclusion that the most probable source -- based off of the
5 pictures that we were looking at and the ship schematic, it
6 looked more a rupture on the Number 3 tank, and so we were
7 looking at that as our most probable source of discharge.

8 Q. Going back for a second --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- what did he tell you that the max capacity was of
11 the tanks?

12 A. From what I remember it was 80.4 metric tons of NF380
13 in the Number 3, and in the Number 4 tank it was 742 metric
14 tons of IF380.

15 Q. And where did he get those --

16 A. That was from the Oil Record Book that we got those
17 numbers.

18 Q. What percent full were these tanks? Were they a
19 hundred percent full?

20 A. Their max capacities was around 900 metric tons or
21 like 898, I believe, for each of those tanks. And so Number 3
22 was almost -- like 1/10 or almost empty, you know.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Number 4 was about 3/4.

25 Q. Okay. Now going back to the amounts you were looking

1 at, what was that, the amount of the fuel tanks?

2 A. They had a -- no. They had a ship schematic --

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. -- on the wall where it had a diagram of the ship and
5 the tank placement, and we were looking at the picture and like
6 lining it up with the ship schematic as far as where the
7 rupture was at and where the final bead had stopped, trying to
8 place it as to which tank was still leaking at the end.

9 Q. Okay. Did you get a copy of the schematic?

10 A. The ship schematic? No. It's a big metal sheet
11 posted on the wall, so it wasn't -- unless we were going to do
12 like a crayon rubbing. You know, we didn't really have the
13 paper for that either.

14 Q. Okay, but it shows you the layout of the fuel tanks?
15 Did it show you how big they are?

16 A. It shows -- I mean to a sense it's to scale, and it's
17 just a diagram. In other words, it's got the placement of the
18 numbers of the tanks and where they are on the ship, and you
19 look at -- it's got one for each side.

20 Q. So you were trying to compare visually what you were
21 seeing on the outside with this?

22 A. With this, and it is -- I mean it shows the
23 superstructure and the engine print on the schematic, so it
24 gives you a good placement as far as trying to figure out where
25 the -- which tanks were ruptured because he did not know if

1 both or either one was ruptured.

2 Q. Did he tell you that he thought it was 3 and 4 or
3 did --

4 A. He was saying that he could not determine which one
5 it was.

6 Q. But he was concerned about both of them?

7 A. With both. Because of the locality of it, it could
8 be either/or.

9 Q. Okay. And then as far as when you asked him to
10 conduct soundings what did he tell you?

11 A. He came back saying that the sounding tubes were bent
12 and that he could not take a reading.

13 Q. And then what did you ask him to do after he told you
14 that?

15 A. I was asking him -- at that time we had wandered into
16 the -- while we were waiting we went over to the gauge room.
17 It was right next to the ship's office.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And I was asking him what were the gauges for the
20 Number 3 and the Number 4 tank, and he couldn't identify that
21 for me --

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. -- because we wanted to -- even though they were
24 increments of 10 metric tons, we -- I mean that would give us a
25 rough estimate, you know.

1 Q. But he couldn't identify where they were?

2 A. I was drawing pictures of tanks, writing the numbers
3 in, trying to like point with my hands as to which and he kept
4 giving me the -- you know, the shaking of the head, that he
5 didn't understand.

6 Q. So the gauges weren't labeled?

7 A. They were labeled. There was a lot of duplication of
8 numbers and the written description on the tank was in Chinese,
9 so --

10 Q. That doesn't make very good --

11 A. -- we couldn't identify on our own. We tried, you
12 know.

13 Q. Okay. So you looked at the gauges, tried to
14 distinguish those, and then from the schematic and what you
15 observed it looked like Tank 3?

16 A. It looked like Tank Number 3 to us, and we talked it
17 over between myself and Petty Officer Eaton. The Chief
18 Engineer was there. I don't know if he could understand or
19 follow. We were trying to discuss it with him, but it wasn't
20 much of a two way conversation. So when I found out the max
21 capacity of the tanks, I had briefed that up to the Command
22 Center. And then during sometime in the interview I tried to
23 get a hold of Mr. Boher (ph.) to act an interpreter and he was
24 in the middle of critical information communication with
25 Headquarters and what not. But at that time -- once again, the

1 Chief Engineer couldn't -- I had asked him if he spoke Chinese
2 just to verify if he wasn't a different international type crew
3 member and if he spoke Cantonese or Mandarin, the Chinese that
4 I know of.

5 Q. Did he understand what you were saying?

6 A. No. He wouldn't acknowledge if he spoke Chinese or
7 which dialect, so --

8 Q. Okay. So after you asked him to sound them he said
9 that they were bent. Is that when you went to look at the
10 schematic?

11 A. While he was out of the -- it was kind of -- we were
12 doing -- I did it initially and then we asked him to -- because
13 I was trying to get a feel for it. I was having him try to
14 like point to -- okay, where's it at, which tanks are damaged?
15 Okay. Show me the Oil Record Book, you know, for these two
16 tanks.

17 Q. Did he show you the Oil Record Book?

18 A. Yes. I was looking through the Oil Record Book.

19 Q. Is that where you got the --

20 A. That's where I got the max capacities and the pre-
21 incident amounts.

22 Q. Okay. So what else did he -- were you -- did you
23 ever leave the Chief Engineer?

24 A. When I asked him to go sound the tanks again, I went
25 up towards -- to talk to the Captain.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And I left Petty Officer Eaton for the results for
3 the sounding.

4 Q. How was he -- but could he sound the tanks?

5 A. Who?

6 Q. He asked the Chief Engineer to sound the tanks again,
7 but I thought he couldn't sound them.

8 A. No. I just wanted him to try again.

9 Q. Oh, to try again. Okay.

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. So you went to talk to the Master. What did you talk
14 with the Master about?

15 A. I went up to the Master to make sure that he had --
16 well, first, to let him know why we were there, and then to
17 make sure that he had made his notifications to his agents and
18 to his Oil Spill Response Organization and get the ball
19 rolling. I know that my people back here were working that
20 angle, but I had to make sure for myself.

21 Q. Sure. Did you talk to him about anything else?

22 A. I just told him that we were working on the Chief
23 Engineer to determine the spill amount. It was the second time
24 I went up that I issued him the Notice of Federal Interest.

25 Q. Okay. Did you have any difficulties communicating

1 with the Master?

2 A. I had some difficulty communicating with the Master.

3 His English was better than the Chief Engineer, but he was
4 having difficulty locating his agent's number --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. -- which specifically his OSRO was for this area.
7 So, I mean, I was getting my message across to him. He
8 understood what I was talking about. But I had some
9 questionability as to whether he made the notifications, so
10 when I got back down to the ship's office he was still waiting
11 for the Chief Engineer. You know, I made phone calls to the
12 agent and verified that they had initiated their response
13 actions for the spill.

14 Q. Okay. Did you discuss at all with the Master that
15 you were having problems getting information from the Chief
16 Engineer?

17 A. No, I didn't.

18 Q. Okay. So then you left the Master. Did you go back
19 to the Chief Engineer?

20 A. Yeah. I went back down to the --

21 Q. To the ship's office?

22 A. -- ship's office and the Chief Engineer came back.

23 Q. And what did he tell you?

24 A. It's the same answer, that the sounding tubes were
25 bent, he's not able to take a sounding. And I was asking him

1 if we could take a sounding of the HFO double-bottom tank and
2 he was transferring about six metric tons an hour. He was
3 saying it would take awhile for the product to heat up to get a
4 faster transfer, but it was still going to be a few hours
5 before the transfer was complete and any numbers we got until
6 then wouldn't be worth anything because we couldn't take
7 samples of the three tanks in conjunction to get a net loss.
8 So at that point what we had was here's the rough transfer
9 amounts, a suspected source or a most probable source based off
10 of our assumptions or educated guesses, I guess you might say,
11 on the ship schematic. And from what we had, the numbers were
12 adding up except for the variance of the .4 and like the .5 on
13 the Number 4 tank on the metric tons.

14 Q. What about Tank 4?

15 A. Tank 4 had -- it was the same thing. It was like a
16 .5 metric ton like missing according to his rough estimates on
17 the transfers.

18 Q. So you had .4 missing from Tank 3 and .5 from --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. So .9 total missing?

21 A. .9 total, yeah.

22 Q. What does that equate to?

23 A. About 200, 300 gallons.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Of course, I didn't know the conversion amount for

1 metric ton to gallon at the time.

2 Q. Yeah. I wouldn't either.

3 A. I think I was stressing the point to get the spill
4 quantification based off of the observed spill amount that we
5 noted on the way in.

6 Q. Okay. When you -- so what did you report back and
7 who did you report back to?

8 A. I reported numbers back to my chain of command and --

9 Q. Who would that be?

10 A. I can't say for certain whether it was Chief Mosley
11 or Munoz.

12 Q. So one of the two of them?

13 A. One of the two. And then I also gave a brief to
14 Mr. Boher and we went over the transfer amounts, you know, like
15 what we had come up with that far, the max amount of the tanks
16 and the observed spill amount on the way in.

17 Q. Did you tell -- did you report back .4 metric tons or
18 .9 metric tons?

19 A. I reported -- I gave him all the transfer amounts,
20 what was in the tanks before, what the products were, what the
21 Chief Engineer said that he had transferred, about this much,
22 and then that the numbers were adding up and what we had
23 missing was .4 metric tons from our probable source, the Number
24 3 tank of the MF380.

25 Q. Did you tell him about the .5?

1 A. That was part of the numbers, but I wasn't stressing
2 that because I thought that --

3 Q. So you didn't really think it was Tank 4 based on --

4 A. Based off of what we saw, we didn't think it was.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. But I think in the end it was mainly Tank 4.

7 Q. Yeah. Is that because of the way the tear was
8 shaped?

9 A. Based off of where the leak was at when we got there,
10 it looked like Number 4 was just kind of dented in --

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. -- and that it had punctured Number 3 or it must have
13 been like right at the border. And then we looked at the tank
14 levels and we were thinking that if the Number 4 had been
15 punctured, then it would still be leaking because it was 3/4
16 full. That was just an assumption based off the placement on
17 the ship schematic, where the last leak was coming out of and
18 the tank levels.

19 Q. Do you know what your people, what Mosley and Munoz,
20 were doing with the information that you were sending back to
21 them?

22 A. No, I do not. I was working my angles and
23 coordinating with the vessels that were outside of the ship
24 because we were the people onboard so they were running things
25 through us.

1 Q. Did any other Coast Guard personnel board the boat
2 while you were onboard?

3 A. Yes, the Marine Investigation Team consisting of
4 Commander Auchenbach, CW4, and Chief Brown. And I met them, I
5 believe, at 11:00 and gave them a brief when they got onboard
6 of what I had done and who I had talked to.

7 Q. Did they have any questions for you?

8 A. They had some questions, but mostly we were kind of
9 on two different sides of the investigation.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And he had asked if I had conducted any breathalyzer
12 or alcohol testing and I didn't have those assets, so no.

13 Q. Are you aware if Auchenbach had any dealings with the
14 Chief Engineer?

15 A. We were going back to the Chief Engineer after they
16 went to the bridge. We went back to the Chief Engineer to try
17 to get samples from the tanks. He was telling us that we
18 couldn't take samples until the transfer was complete, and
19 that's when they called him up to be interviewed at the bridge.

20 Q. Who called him?

21 A. They radioed for him, but they were saying that the
22 Marine Investigators were -- they needed him at the bridge
23 for --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. -- and interview. So they were probably going to do

1 the breathalyzer, as well.

2 Q. Okay. Did any other Coast Guard people board while
3 you were onboard?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Okay. Were you onboard when the OSPR (ph.) group
6 came onboard?

7 A. No. I briefed them when I got off. They rode back
8 on the same Coast Guard boat that dropped me off, so I briefed
9 them on the docks there.

10 Q. Okay. So you returned, they took your boat and --

11 A. Well, I was briefing back that we couldn't
12 ascertain -- well, based off of what I had I couldn't get the
13 actual spill amount until the transfer was complete and that
14 was going to take a few hours. Then they told me that OSPR,
15 the Spill Quantification Team, was going to be meeting us at
16 the dock so I needed to disembark and meet them at the dock as
17 soon as possible so they can get onboard.

18 Q. Okay. So it was the Marine Inspection Team who told
19 you that OSPR --

20 A. No, no. This came from --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. -- the Command Center.

23 Q. Oh, the Command Center told you that --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- the OSPR team was coming, you needed to get

1 back --

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. -- and then swap places with them essentially?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. So did you --

6 A. And that also came from Chief Mosley, too.

7 Q. Okay. When you me the OSPR people at the dock did
8 you talk with them at all?

9 A. Yes. I gave -- I was mostly talking to Roy and I
10 gave him all the numbers, the difficulty -- the language
11 barrier that we were having with the Chief Engineer, the
12 description of the tear. We showed him some pictures from the
13 view of the camera, and we also told him that he was saying
14 that we couldn't take samples until the transfer was complete.
15 You know, we gave him a pretty good overview of what we had
16 done and what was going on on the vessel.

17 Q. Did you tell him about the .4 metric tons with the --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And what did -- did he say anything about that?

20 A. He was just -- he was mostly just listening to what
21 we were saying. I think he had a couple questions, but I can't
22 remember offhand.

23 Q. How confident were you in the number that the Chief
24 Engineer gave you?

25 A. As far as the total spill amount?

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. When we came back and we did our conversion and saw
3 that it was, you know, a little over a hundred gallons, that
4 we -- we knew that's a wrong number just based off of observed
5 spill amounts.

6 Q. Did you tell that to anybody?

7 A. Yeah -- well, at the time there was nobody else back
8 in the office, but I was under the assumption that they were --
9 that they had done a quantification based off of the observed
10 spill size.

11 Q. That who did the quantification?

12 A. Someone from our office.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. But they hadn't?

16 A. Not -- I can't say for certain whether they had or
17 not.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. As far as I know, no.

20 Q. Okay. But when you got back you converted the .4
21 metric tons to like this is only a hundred-and-some gallons --

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. -- that's not right?

24 A. Well, we knew that wasn't going to be very accurate
25 based off of this was an ongoing transfer. He was giving us an

1 estimated transfer amount, so inherently there is going to be
2 like that much of a variance anyways, so we didn't really
3 understand why the numbers were adding up when he was giving us
4 the thing, so we were like well, there's nothing missing, you
5 know, but -- so we knew that the numbers were wrong, but that's
6 all we had, you know.

7 Q. Okay. Once you did the conversion did you pass over
8 what -- that it was only 146 gallons, did you pass that on to
9 anybody once you got back?

10 A. At the time everybody was in the ICP and Petty
11 Officer Eaton went to get some lunch, and I was waiting for the
12 orders and just running back and forth from the ICP to Chief
13 Mosley.

14 Q. So did you tell anybody it was 146?

15 A. They had told -- I think we went over there after
16 they had already said that it was 140 gallons and they said
17 that they got that from the Chief Engineer.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I didn't realize that that was from the .4 that I had
20 given them, so I didn't tie the two together.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. They were saying that that was the number that they
23 got, and, you know, that kind of blew me away, so --

24 Q. Did you express any concerns to anyone that you
25 thought that quantity was low based on your observations?

1 A. I thought that it was kind of implied, I mean just
2 based off of thick black crude for two nautical miles and three
3 to four feet across. Based off of our -- myself and Petty
4 Officer Eaton's spit-balling, we thought it was around 1,500 to
5 2,000 gallons but, you know, we couldn't say that for certain.
6 We hadn't worked the formula. Our job -- are for sheening and
7 like thinner oils, so --

8 Q. Okay. So you'd never seen anything like this before?

9 A. Thick black crude? No. You know, this is once in a
10 career kind of spill.

11 Q. Okay. All right. So nobody seemed to be really
12 questioning the amount. Was anybody working -- when you were
13 going between the ICS were they actually working on like trying
14 to figure out like how much oil had really come out or were
15 they kind of waiting for OSPR to give them --

16 A. I think they were waiting for an exact amount, but
17 that would be speculation.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I just didn't know what was going in here. I don't
20 know. Maybe they had to talk to Chief Mosley or -- Roberts.

21 Q. Were they sending out any other folks to do
22 assessments of the local area that you were aware of?

23 A. We had sent out a SCAT Team (ph.) --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. -- of Petty Officer Munoz and Petty Officer

1 Millenstein (ph.). They were working with SF marine units to
2 try to assess the spill size. They had the -- we had verified
3 while we were onboard that the IC Boat Spill Chaser was out
4 there trying to assess the spill size. They also had a
5 skimming boat. I think they got there around 10:30 --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. -- but we verified that they were on the scene
8 assessing.

9 Q. Okay. Did you have any dealings with Snyder at all?

10 A. Not too much. I think I might have briefed her one
11 time --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. -- just because I was just trying to get a hold of
14 anyone.

15 Q. So mainly Mosley and Munoz?

16 A. Yes, and whoever I get a hold of in the Command
17 Center.

18 Q. Okay.

19 MS. THOMAS: Did you have any questions you'd like to
20 ask, Paul?

21 MR. STANSEL: Maybe just to clarify a couple of
22 points.

23 BY MR. STANSEL:

24 Q. The amount of the .4 metric tons --

25 A. Okay.

1 Q. -- that you received from the Chief Engineer, could
2 you explain again exactly how he arrived at that figure? You
3 mentioned it was something to do with transfer rate and --

4 A. He had told me that initially they had 80.4 metric
5 tons in the Number 3 tank and that he had transferred
6 approximately -- based on my -- I forget if it was 30 or 50
7 metric tons, but what we were coming up with getting to the
8 double-bottom -- flow tank, so his numbers added up in that
9 sense except for the .4 metric tons from the initial amount.

10 Q. And how was he arriving at those numbers, based on
11 the pump rate or --

12 A. He was it was based off of his gauges or it was -- I
13 can't actually say for certain. It was kind of -- it got a
14 little muddy when we started asking him how he was getting his
15 numbers.

16 Q. And this figure comes from what he transferred from
17 Tank Number 3 --

18 A. To the double-bottom, yes.

19 Q. -- to the double-bottom? And he didn't give you any
20 figures with respect to Tank Number 4?

21 A. No, he gave me the figures for Tank Number 4 as far
22 as he --

23 Q. As far as what he thought was missing or --

24 A. No, as to what he had transferred. So he gave us
25 pre-transfer amounts of 742, transferred 192, and he had

1 probably about 550 left in the tank, so we were looking at .5
2 metric tons missing from -- I was looking for a net loss from
3 transfer amounts and original amounts and what's left from what
4 he was giving me and there wasn't really any net loss except
5 for the .4 and the .5.

6 Q. And he never converted that to gallons for you?

7 A. No.

8 Q. He did that back here?

9 A. When we had passed it off, yeah, we didn't know the
10 conversion from metric tons to gallons. When we got back to
11 the office we did out of -- we assumed that they had done a
12 conversion when we gave them those numbers. We did it out of
13 curiosity to see how much it was in gallons.

14 Q. And the size of the tank or what the total amount
15 that was in it was the potential amount of the spill? That's
16 what you were trying to determine from that?

17 A. Could you please rephrase?

18 Q. When you ascertained the total amount of oil that
19 were in the two tanks --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- you were looking at what the total potential was?

22 A. That was the initial number I passed. As soon as I
23 found out the total amounts in the tank, total capacities of
24 the tank, I passed that forward.

25 Q. And who exactly did you give that information to?

1 A. I gave that to one of my supervisors in IMD and to
2 the Command Center --

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. -- just because that's what we base -- the spill
5 response is based off of. It was, you know, max capacity
6 spilled.

7 Q. And was that amongst the first messages that you
8 relayed back?

9 A. Yes -- well, I mean besides the bridge and the
10 exterior --

11 Q. Right, but once you got --

12 A. Once I got onboard that was like one of the first
13 phone calls I made.

14 Q. Okay.

15 MR. STANSEL: I don't think I have anything else.

16 MS. THOMAS: Okay.

17 BY MS. THOMAS:

18 Q. Just as far as your observations when you went out,
19 how was the fog situation?

20 A. It started -- I mean when we first went out it was
21 soup. We couldn't -- we could only see a couple hundred feet.

22 Q. So that was around 9:00, right?

23 A. Yeah, around 9:00.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. When we were at the vessel -- I mean we were almost

1 right up on the vessel before we could see it, you know, just a
2 couple hundred feet off.

3 Q. What about when you departed?

4 A. When we departed it had burned off quite a bit.

5 Q. Around what time was that? I'm sorry.

6 A. We departed around -- I think it was either 11 or
7 11:30.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Yeah. I believe it was right around 11:30.

10 Q. And it was clearing up a little, was it still pretty
11 foggy or --

12 A. It was still foggy, but it was starting to clear up,
13 you know.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. We had pretty decent visibility.

16 Q. And this was at Anchorage 9, right?

17 A. At Anchorage 9, yes.

18 Q. On the way up from Anchorage 9 back to Sector San
19 Francisco did you notice any large patches?

20 A. No. We actually went to do our open water sample
21 north of the bridge. It was starting to disperse. It was
22 spreading out, so it was actually a little harder to get to a
23 thick enough concentration where I could take a sample over the
24 side.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. But we just -- what we noticed was just what looked
2 like the initial strip had started to spread out on the
3 surface.

4 Q. Did you notice any big patches of oil or a smell, a
5 heavy smell, in the air?

6 A. When we first arrived on scene we couldn't see any
7 oil except the splatter on the concrete abutment, but we had a
8 strong like diesel or fuel odor, you know, like Benzene. We
9 could definitely smell it, but we couldn't see anything.

10 Q. Okay. Do you recall that day like when the fog like
11 really started to clear up?

12 A. I was inboard on the ship for most of it. I know
13 when I went to verify that the Spill Chaser and their vessel
14 was there it was still foggy, but by the time I left it had
15 started to clear up.

16 Q. Okay. I think that's all the questions I have. Is
17 there anything else you'd like to add that you think could help
18 us?

19 A. I mean I don't really understand what you're trying
20 to determine at this point.

21 Q. We're basically just piecing together the information
22 as far as -- like I explained to you before, how information
23 was passed back and forth, how it was assessed, how it was
24 relayed up the chain of command, interactions with the crew
25 members just to kind of piece everything together here.

1 A. I mean I think -- determined the spill amounts around
2 the same time as Roy Mathers based off of, that would have been
3 about the time the transfer was complete, and they could have
4 gotten the actual spill size or the net loss from the tanks.
5 That's about it.

6 Q. I think Admiral Bone mentioned in his interview that
7 Roy Mathers told him something about he knew that it was over
8 50,000 gallons within like 20 minutes of getting onboard. How
9 could he have known that, just like his experience? I mean
10 what would he -- the transfer obviously wasn't complete yet.

11 A. Maybe based off of -- I mean I would be speculating
12 off of his knowledge. I can't --

13 Q. Yeah.

14 A. I can't really say. I mean I know that he sails as a
15 Chief Engineer, so his expertise is a lot higher than mine.

16 Q. Okay. Well, that's all I have. Thank you very much
17 for your time, appreciate it.

18 (Whereupon, the interview in the above-entitled
19 matter was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: M/V COSCO BUSAN/BRIDGE ALLISION
 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
 Interview of MST2 Peter Anderson

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-08-MM-004

PLACE:

DATE: January 30, 2008

was held according to the record, and that this is the
original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been
compared to the recording accomplished at the hearing.

Cheryl L. Phipps
Transcriber